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In this paper we examine the application of informed consent to ethnographic research in health care settings.  We do not quarrel with either the principle of informed consent or its translation into the requirement that research should only be carried out with consenting participants.  However, we do challenge the identification of informed consent with the particular set of bureaucratic practices of ethical review which currently operate in Canada, the US and elsewhere.  We argue that these anticipatory regulatory regimes threaten the significant contribution of ethnographic research to the creation of more efficient, more effective, more equitable and more humane health care systems.  Informed consent in ethnographic research is neither achievable nor demonstrable in the terms set by anticipatory regulatory regimes that take clinical research or biomedical experimentation as their paradigm cases.  This is because of differences in the practices of ethnographic and biomedical research which we discuss.  These include the extended periods of time ethnographers spend in the research setting, the emergent nature of ethnographic research focus and design , the nature and positioning of risk in ethnographic research, the power relationships between researchers and participants, and the public and semi-public nature of the settings normally studied .  Anticipatory regulatory regimes are inimical to ethnographic research and risk undermining the contribution of systematic inquiry to understanding whether institutions do what they claim to do, fairly and civilly and with an appropriate mobilisation of resources.  We do not suggest that we should simply ignore ethics or leave matters to the individual consciences of researchers.  Rather, we need to develop and strengthen professional models of regulation which emphasise education, training and mutual accountability.  We conclude the paper with a number of suggestions about how such professional models might be implemented.
Introduction
This paper discusses the impact of the concept of informed consent, adopted in ethical review by most anticipatory regulatory regimes, on qualitative research in sociology, with particular reference to ethnography.  Drawing upon our own experiences of such research over the last thirty five years, we consider the relevance of these regimes to the ethical dilemmas which, in practice, confront ethnographers.  We also consider the threat of such bureaucratic regulation to ethnography’s contribution to improving the efficiency, effectiveness, equity and humanity of health services.   

Ethnography typically involves researchers spending extended periods of time (sometimes a year or longer) in one or more settings (for example, a hospital ward, a general practice surgery, a laboratory or an out-patient clinic) observing what goes on, talking to members of the setting, collecting documents and, on occasion, interviewing.  The researcher’s objective is to recover the ‘situated rationality of action’ – the ways in which, in context, people’s actions make sense, even when they seem, to others outside the situation, to be inappropriate or counter-productive.  

Studies of this kind have a long and distinguished history in sociological research on health and health care.  Classic examples include Goffman on mental hospitals (1961), Glaser and Strauss on death and dying (1965), Becker et al. (1961) on the professional socialisation of medical students and Davis (1963) on the experiences of polio victims and their families.  More recently ethnographies of hospital wards (Allen 1997), responses to medical error (Bosk 1979), paediatric clinics (Strong, 1979) genetic counselling in a children’s hospital (Bosk 1992), care in private nursing homes (Diamond 1992), paediatric intensive care (Anspach, 1992) emergency rooms (Timmermans 1999), the construction of disease (Mol 2002) and medical examiners (Timmermans 2006) have all made important contributions to our understanding of health care organization.

Ethnographies have a key role to play in creating a more efficient, more effective, more equitable and more humane health care system, particularly in illuminating the organizational and interactional processes through which health care is delivered.  They offer important information, to policy makers and practitioners, about factors that compromise or promote high quality care, particularly the ways in which well-intentioned actions may have unanticipated negative consequences.  

The elaborate, bureaucratised, systems of ethical review currently operating in the US, Canada, UK and elsewhere threaten the survival of ethnographic research with little gain in protecting research participants.  These anticipatory regulatory regimes were developed for governance of clinical and biomedical research, primarily in response to abusive experimentation in Nazi Germany revealed in the Nuremberg Trials (Lifton 1986; Annas and Grodin 1992; Hazelgrove 2002; Schmidt 2004; Weindling 2004).   The subsequent uncovering of highly questionable clinical and biomedical research practices between the 1920s and 1950s, in both the US and the UK, strengthened the case for the regulatory regimes that began to develop from the mid-1960s (Beecher 1959, 1966; Hazelgrove 2002; Jones 1981; Papworth 1967; Rothman 1993).  However, these regimes are ill-suited to assessing ethnographic study proposals (Murphy and Dingwall 2003).  This is neither because ethnographic research is free from ethical challenges, nor because such challenges are unusually difficult or intransigent.  It is, rather, because anticipatory regulatory regimes are based on assumptions derived from the model of clinical trials or biomedical experimentation, with prior specification of hypotheses, design, instruments and implementation in protocols that are finalised before the study begins.  In principle, this model is readily transferable to survey research, where it is possible to specify, in advance, exactly what a study will involve. This is not true of ethnographic research.  In the rest of this paper, we explore the ways in which ethnographic research in sociology departs from the assumptions underlying these regimes before concluding by considering the implications for designing appropriate regulation.

We should, though, first be clear that we have no quarrel with the notion that research participation should be free from coercion. The concept of informed consent is deeply embedded in liberal individualist assumptions about the virtue of autonomy and the priority of individual over community rights (D’Agostino 1998; Wolpe 1998).  However, respect for persons, as operationalised through the practice of informed consent, is only one of the three principles articulated in The Belmont Report (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979) which underpins the subsequent development of Institutional Review Boards (US), Research Ethics Boards (Canada) and Ethics Committees (UK).  The other principles, of justice and beneficence, are equally relevant and may, in some instances, compete with the principle of autonomy (Wolpe 1998).  Nevertheless, our critique in this paper is neither of the principle of autonomy, nor of its operationalisation in the requirement that research should only be carried out with consenting participants.  Our challenge is to the identification of the principle with a particular set of bureaucratic practices more suited to biomedical experimentation.

Ethnographers do not universally share our commitment to openness in research.  Some reject the principle of informed consent altogether, defending covert methods and deliberately misleading people about their research purposes (Douglas 1976).  Others defend deceit in terms of the value of the research findings.  For example, Diamond argues that the value of his exposé of the exploitation of nursing assistants and the erosion of patient autonomy, privacy and dignity in three Chicago nursing homes justifies any wrong done to unwitting participants in his ‘undercover’ research study (Diamond 1992).  If his employers had found out that he was doing research, he would have been dismissed and unable to complete the study.  Given the choice between abandoning his research and misleading staff and patients, he chose the latter.  The compromise of autonomy was, in his view, outweighed by the beneficence of the findings for residents and workers.

Diamond is, however, in the minority among contemporary ethnographers.  Most, including ourselves, interpret the principle of respect for persons as requiring us to conduct research as overtly as possible consistent with avoiding distress or disruption to the settings we study.  While deception may be ‘shaded in many different ways’ (Haggerty 2004) and, in research as in everyday life, the boundary between truth and deceit is often blurred, we are wary of the argument that the ends justify the means.  Such judgements often depend too heavily on individual researchers’ estimation of the value of ends in which they have a heavy personal investment.  We also believe that the difficulties of obtaining valid data using overt methods in even very challenging settings can be exaggerated.  There are numerous examples of ethnographers being granted access to highly sensitive settings including the UK night-time economy (Monaghan 2004), the British Civil Service (Heclo & Wildavsky, 1974), the Mafia (Ianni and Ianni, 1972), professional ‘fences’ (Klockars, 1979), professional criminals (Polsky, 1971) and drug barons (Adler, 1985) (see also the discussions in Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000).  Moreover, covert ethnographers may underestimate harm caused to those they study, if and when they discover they have been misled about the researcher’s real interest (Bulmer 1980).  Subjects of covert research may be harmed as well as wronged.

Our argument is not that informed consent is trivial or irrelevant.  It is, rather, that informed consent in ethnography is neither achievable nor demonstrable in the terms set by anticipatory regulatory regimes that take clinical research or biomedical experimentation as their paradigm cases. This is because of fundamental differences in the practices of ethnographic and experimental research that we now examine. 

Extended periods of involvement in research settings
In ethnography, researchers spend extended periods of time, often a year or more, in their research setting.  The practice of obtaining prior informed consent was developed in relation to the discrete episodic interventions typical of clinical trials or biomedical experimentation.  Such interventions lend themselves to the legalistic, contractual approach embodied in obtaining signed consent from research subjects prior to the start of research.  In ethnography, consent is more likely to be negotiated and renegotiated over time as the relationship between the ethnographer and the research hosts develops (Adler and Adler, 2002).  Although ethnographers have traditionally described the people involved in their research as participants or informants, we prefer the terminology of ‘hosts’ here because it better captures the nature of the relationship: ethnographers are guests in someone else’s setting and, like guests everywhere, there are clear, if not always explicitly articulated, expectations of proper behaviour. The status of guests is always fragile and depends on appropriate conduct towards their hosts, although this is not necessarily reciprocated.  

Typically, at the start of such research, consent is both tentative and limited and the researcher’s access to sensitive aspects of the setting may be restricted.  Over time, as the trust between researcher and hosts develops, access may be granted to previously restricted areas or interactions.  However, such access is rarely guaranteed and depends upon the ethnographers’ capacity for sustaining the goodwill and co-operation of their hosts.  Such co-operation can be, and sometimes is, withdrawn.  At times, this may lead to the researcher having to leave the setting completely.  In Dingwall’s (1983) work on child protection, for example, fieldwork in the A&E department of a major university hospital was terminated when the junior doctors realised that he had observed their, officially deviant, informal re-organization of their shifts to allow more of them to attend the hospital ball for at least some part of the evening.   More often, the researcher finds access to particular aspects of the setting or its activities is restricted, as when, for example, the researcher is refused access to particularly sensitive meetings or areas within the research setting.  In his PhD study of the training of health visitors (public health nurses), for example, Dingwall (1974; 1977) was unable to observe one-to-one tutorial meetings between the course staff and students, which clearly played an important part in the way that staff searched for, and generated evidence of, student competence, because of the tutors’ concern for the students’ privacy in receipt of criticism.  

Ethnographic consent is a relational and sequential process rather than a contractual agreement and lasts throughout the period of research (Katz and Fox 2004).  It is based on trust between researcher and researched and is a matter over which research hosts exercise ongoing judgement.  The relationship between the ethnographer and their hosts is more akin to that of a patient with a general practitioner than with a surgeon.  The patient gives tentative and limited consent before contact with a general practitioner.  Over time, as the relationship develops, the patient may agree to or solicit further contact, accept or reject advice as it is offered and, from time to time, agree to specific interventions.  Mostly, consent is implied rather than stated and operates within a context where the patient may withdraw cooperation at any time.  Unlike the anaesthetised patient, the general practice patient surrenders relatively little autonomy.  The same is true of most ethnographic research, where successful execution depends upon establishing and maintaining a long-term relationship of trust with research hosts (Bosk, 2004; Katz and Fox, 2004).

Of course ethnographers do face ethical dilemmas around consent.  Indeed, some dilemmas are heightened by the extended periods that researchers spend in the field and may be more nuanced and subtle than in the case of the discrete, episodic interventions that characterise biomedicine (Corrigan, 2003).  It is in the nature of ethnography that researchers seek to minimise their own impact on the settings they study.  This reflects a concern, on the one hand, to reduce any disturbance or inconvenience to hosts and, on the other, to avoid distorting the setting and hence rendering findings unrepresentative.  As researchers become integrated into the setting, they form relationships with hosts.  Over time, these hosts may come to overlook the research purpose and the researcher’s identity qua researcher begins, for the hosts at least, to fade into the background.  The line between researcher and friend or confidante becomes blurred and hosts may disclose information that they do not recognise as relevant to the research but which the researcher considers to be so.  This raises questions about the extent to which the hosts’ prior consent justifies the use of such disclosures as data.  In Dingwall’s (1974) PhD work, for example, he was invited to parties thrown by members of the student group.  Observation at these events was an important source of data on the lateral life roles of the students, particularly a number of conversations with women in their late 20s and early 30s about their prospects of marriage or whether they would end up settling for a career in nursing.  The study was strongly influenced by the US work of Olesen and Whittaker (1968) on baccalaureate student nurses and of Psathas (1968) on diploma students, where this tension had been identified as a significant issue for understanding student commitment to their courses and intended occupation and these were clearly relevant data.  However, these were ‘off-duty’ occasions where some tongues were undoubtedly loosened by alcohol.  In the end, Dingwall decided not to use specific quotes, except for one instance where a student used a line from a popular song to describe her feelings about the impact of a number of unsuccessful relationships. However, he did make general references to these observations and the sorts of conversations that occurred between him and the students, which seemed important evidence for his discussion of the interactions between personal and professional lives. 
Emergent research focus and design
Since Nuremberg, there has been general agreement between ethicists, regulators and scientists that research participation must not only be voluntary but also based on adequate knowledge and understanding of the nature, duration, purpose, methods and potential hazards of the study.  This has, in practice, been translated into the requirement that the research participant give written consent, at the outset, based on a clear specification of the research.  Clearly, it is not straightforward to determine what is to count as adequate knowledge in either biomedical or social research.  In both, the research is often embedded in highly technical and theoretical concepts that may be opaque to potential participants.  There are practical difficulties in making explanations accessible to participants without distorting the true nature of the research or, as Brewster Smith (1979) observed, ‘sending informants and cohabitants to graduate school’ (p.14).  Accounts that both biomedical and ethnographic researchers give to potential research participants are inevitably partial without necessarily reflecting any desire to deceive.  Such accounts can never represent the simple, unmediated truth.  Of necessity, they will be designed for the audiences for which they are intended​[1]​.  Otherwise, they might be true but incomprehensible.  The adequacy of such accounts is always a matter of judgement and debate.

However, ethnographic research confronts an additional difficulty.  In biomedical research, it is normally possible to specify in advance precisely what the study will involve.  In ethnography, both the research focus and the research design typically emerge during the course of the research (O’Neill, 2002).  Consequently, the researcher is rarely able to give a full account at the outset of what the research will involve, simply because she or he may not yet know.  Flexibility of research design, and capacity to respond to insights emerging from early empirical work, are distinctive contributions of ethnography, but complicate the process of obtaining prior informed consent.  For example, Murphy is currently researching the transition from children’s to adult services for young people with moderate to severe intellectual disabilities.  Gaining initial consent to carry out this longitudinal research was an elaborate process involving the young people, their parents, social workers and health care providers as well as managers and supervisors.  While the team was able to negotiate initial consent to the study with each of these groups, it was not always obvious from the outset exactly what it would be useful to observe or whom it would be appropriate to interview.  Indeed, in some cases, it was only once the research was under way that they were able to identify the key meetings, facilities and personnel. Moreover, these changed over the period of the fieldwork as new policies and systems were introduced and new appointments made.   This necessitated frequent negotiations and renegotiations, which cannot be accommodated within a model that relies on fixing consent in writing at the outset.

Analysis of ethnographic data is an iterative process where, typically, the researcher sets out with a broad question to be investigated and the precise lines of analysis emerge as the data accumulate.  Again, this can be difficult to reconcile with the requirement that participants are fully informed about the purpose of the research before it commences.  Some authors (e.g. Richards and Schwartz, 2002) suggest that returning to participants at the end of the study to seek consent to use findings once the shape of the analysis is clear.  This approach risks undermining the credibility and impartiality of ethnographic findings.  There is always the possibility that honest inquiry will produce uncomfortable findings.  To grant participants the power of veto invites them to suppress findings they find unpalatable.  

We believe that what is required is caution when explaining the research at the outset.  For example, in a study of mothers’ experiences of feeding their babies and young children, Murphy described the purpose of the study as ‘improving our understanding of the choices which mothers make about what, when and how to feed their babies’.  This inclusive formulation gave her team freedom to develop lines of analysis that had not been fully anticipated at the outset (Murphy, 1999; 2000; 2003; 2004; in press).  Similarly, Dingwall’s child protection study (Dingwall, Eekelaar, & Murray, 1983) was described as ‘an attempt to understand the workings of a system that was widely considered at the time to be problematic so that its members and stakeholders could consider how it might be improved’. This second example highlights the importance of not being drawn into promising what we are unlikely to be able to produce.  Not unreasonably, research participants frequently base their decision about whether to participate in research on an evaluation of the likely benefits to themselves or others.  There is often a temptation to over-claim the potential contribution of a piece of research to solving participants’ current problems.  In this case, the researchers avoided suggesting that the findings would prescribe improvements in the child protection system.  They made it clear that the contribution of the research would be to illuminate how the current system works as a resource that policy-makers and practitioners might use to identify possible reforms.  Thus, they maintained the boundary between the function of the researcher and that of the policy-maker and clarified what participants could reasonably expect.  

Nature, degree and positioning of risk in ethnographic research


Giving potential participants ‘information on all known foreseeable risks’ (Corrigan 2003) is central to the operationalisation of informed consent.  The application of this principle to ethnographic research is more complex than in biomedical experimentation, where it is normally possible to specify and quantify risks in advance with reasonable precision.  While ethnographic research is not risk-free, for either hosts or researchers (Punch, 1994; Renzetti and Lee 1993, Lee-Treweek 2000), potential harm to hosts is usually different in nature, degree and positioning from that faced by the subjects of biomedical experiments (Lincoln and Tierney, 2004).  Most commonly it involves psychological or social harm.  Participants may be upset, worried or offended during the fieldwork.  For example, the close relationships which develop during ethnographic research sometimes lead hosts to share information they find distressing or embarrassing to talk about, raising concerns about the possible re-awakening of memories and consequent re-victimisation of those who have experienced difficult or traumatic circumstances.   Like most ethnographers, we have experienced such interactions in research, as in our everyday lives.  Sometimes such disclosures appear to have been therapeutic.  At others, they may have been experienced, in retrospect, as embarrassing or regrettable.  However, it is unclear how any conceivable application of the principle of informed consent could protect against such harm.  In all cases, they appear to have chosen freely to share their troubles with us even though they had not, we assume, anticipated doing so when they first agreed to our research.  Bureaucratic practices are largely irrelevant to such situations.  The ethical challenge lies in ensuring that, in such circumstances, hosts are treated with decency, discretion and respect, and have access to whatever support they may subsequently need.

Mostly, however, the point of greatest risk occurs when research findings are published (Murphy and Dingwall 2001).  The reputations and relationships of hosts may be disturbed or damaged by publication.  Hosts may be wounded by what is written about them, sometimes in ways that surprise well-meaning researchers (Ellis 1995).  In a few extreme cases, publication may put participants at risk of legal sanction, which is particularly problematic because, in many jurisdictions, researchers have no legal protection from the obligation to disclose their sources (Haggerty 2004).  However careful and respectful researchers are in their reports, they have minimal control over how these are taken up and transformed by others, including tabloid journalists.   Murphy had the experience of seeing the observation that a significant proportion of parents reported giving their babies token tastes of alcohol, for example by allowing them to suck a finger dipped in the Christening champagne, sensationalised under headlines such as ‘Tiddly tots’ and ‘Alcoholic babies’ (Murphy, 1998).  

The risks that exist in ethnographic research are highly indeterminate, subjective and not always easy to specify and communicate in advance to hosts (Bosk, 2004).  In practice, there is often real difficulty in persuading research participants to engage meaningfully with such hypothetical risks​[2]​.  Their pre-conceptions influence their interpretations of whatever information the researcher offers.  In biomedical experimentation, it is usually possible to offer some actuarial assessment of the probability that risks will occur, but this is not the case in ethnographic research.  Many potential hazards mirror those normally encountered in everyday life, and for which formal consent is not normally considered necessary (Haggerty, 2004; American Association of University Professors 2000).  As Haggerty argues, there is a danger that the unpredictability and indeterminacy of risk may lead to ethics committees applying the precautionary principle in ways that make ethnographic research impossible, without any gain in protection for participants.  In such cases, as Alberti (2000) suggests, fulfilling one function of ethics committees (protecting participants from harm) is achieved at the expense of the other (encouraging research that will improve health care).  Nicholl (2000) argues that when regulatory mechanisms become a barrier to research that is ethical, this is itself unethical.

In practice, ethnographers are most likely to identify risks to their hosts only in the course of carrying out the project.  Guillemin and Gillam (2004) observe that it is in the day-to-day practice of research that ‘ethically important moments’ occur and ethnographers are faced with the decision about how they should respond.  In such circumstances, hosts are likely to be served less well by procedural ethics embodied in regulations requiring fully informed advance consent than by researchers’ conscientious commitment to avoiding exploitative and potentially harmful relationships with those they study.  
Power in researcher/participant relationships
Regulatory practices around biomedical research were born out of concerns about the possible exploitation of power differentials between researcher and researched.  To a large extent, the resulting regulations model the researcher-researched relationship on that believed to prevail between doctors and patients.  The research participant is taken to be passive, vulnerable and in need of protection and the researcher is understood to be powerful and capable of exploiting dependent patients.  Written informed consent in advance is designed to mitigate this unequal power relationship and protect the subjects’ rights during experimental interventions where researcher control is intrinsic to the research design.

This understanding of an asymmetrical relationship between a powerful researcher and a vulnerable research subject may be appropriate in relation to experimental interventions, where research subjects submit to the researcher by surrendering their right to self-determination for the duration of the experiment (but see Morris and Balmer 2006).  Its relevance to ethnographic research, where power is located differently, is less clear-cut.  As Haggerty (2004) observes, while the imagined subjects of social science research are the ‘poor and marginalised’ (p.409) who require special protection, this is not always the case.   Ethnographers often study powerful people in publicly funded settings where informed consent could be interpreted as a self-serving requirement directed at protecting the status quo from interrogation and powerful members from scrutiny.  Research hosts are not invariably the vulnerable and passive individuals imagined in many ethics texts.  There are real questions about whether power brings with it an obligation to contribute to improving knowledge, particularly in relation to the organisation and management of public services. Ethnography is, in many instances, one aspect of public accountability for the use of public resources or the impact of private interests on the public sphere. 

Even where research hosts have less overt power than those discussed above, it would be highly unusual for the researcher to be able to exercise the kind of control that characterises experimenter-subject relations.  In ethnography, researchers typically adopt a passive rather than an active role.   They are highly dependent upon the willingness of hosts to act and speak within their sight and hearing.  Continuing data collection depends crucially upon on-going cooperation from hosts and hosts who are uneasy about the research can obstruct or even terminate it in numerous ways.  Negotiating consent in ethnography is continuous and constantly vulnerable to withdrawal.  Participants have considerable capacity for controlling researchers leading, in extreme cases, to ethnographers abandoning the research altogether. Dingwall (2001), for example, recently sought to write a case study of a major scientific scandal as a problem in organizational deviance and its management. Although much documentation was in the public domain, it soon became clear that the major research university where many of the protagonists worked was unlikely to co-operate, placing an insuperable barrier in the way of funding the project.  While the results would contribute to debates about research governance, and means for implementing this without stifling innovation, the university’s leaders were more concerned with resolving their reputational problems and avoiding further publicity, whether positive or negative, that might draw attention to their experiences.  
Public versus private settings
A further uncertainty concerns the application of the requirement for informed consent to public as opposed to private settings.  Some ethnographies are conducted in settings which are open to the public and where there is no expectation that presence or participation requires prior negotiation.  Such settings are typically highly complex and mobile and this makes obtaining written, or even oral, informed consent from all who pass through impractical.  Sometimes strict application of the requirement that all those are the subject of research must give individual, fully informed consent would mean that the ethnographer was so occupied in negotiating consent that she would have no time to carry out the research and would destroy the setting itself as an object of study.  A number of authors (van den Hoonaard 2002; Haggerty 2004; Adler and Adler 2002) report how, in such circumstances, ethical review boards’ preoccupation with obtaining informed consent has made conducting otherwise unexceptionable studies impossible.   

Such restrictions threaten to extinguish research in public spaces, with consequent loss of important data about social interaction and practices.  It is unclear why researchers’ observations of behaviour in public spaces should be controlled in this way or how such restrictions protect those observed.  People in public spaces knowingly make their behaviour available for scrutiny by anonymous others – British cities are full of CCTV systems continuously scrutinized by a variety of law enforcers, for example.  In that sense, people’s consent to being observed is implied by their simple presence.  Why should ethnographers be subject to more stringent requirements in this respect than other citizens or surveillance agencies?  That said, even public settings have private moments and researchers have an obligation to treat such moments with respect and decency, which may well require them to adopt a self-denying ordinance when faced with what might otherwise be relevant data.  Once again, this requires the kind of ethical sensitivity and situational judgement that cannot be enforced by anticipatory regulatory regimes.

However, many settings ethnographers study are semi-public rather than public and, it may be unclear from whom consent is required.  Whereas biomedical and interview research focus on individuals, ethnographies typically involve extended observations, for example in hospital wards or outpatient departments.  The population is often highly transient and it is not always obvious who should be classed as research participants.  If, for example, the focus of the research is on nurse behaviour on a particular ward, one clearly needs to seek consent from the nurses.  But what about all the other people who are based on or pass through that ward?  How far does that extend: to doctors? to cleaners? to patients? to maintenance staff who make a one-off visit to the ward?.  During extended periods of observation, ethnographers will have many casual encounters with people who pass through.   Once again, if the setting is not to be disrupted, and the research is not to be impractical, one must distinguish between those for whom the research is likely to be consequential and those who are tangential.  Often the risk of harm is so minimal that it is not clear whose interests obtaining consent actually serves.  Elsewhere, Dingwall (1980) has distinguished between ‘principals’ and ‘spear-carriers’. In the child protection study, for example, consent was not sought from families involved in the candidate cases that were tracked through the network of agencies in the main study site.  For this study, they were ‘spear carriers’ because the project’s focus was on how cases were co-produced by professionals and agencies.  Parents’ accounts were irrelevant to this and they were not interviewed as a result of a deliberate decision not to generate ironic data.  Agency decisions were based on what staff deemed to constitute evidence and their mutual assessments of its adequacy for justifying various courses of action. These data were embodied in official records, internal and inter-agency review meetings between professionals and court hearings.  The people involved in these were the ‘principals’ whose consent was carefully negotiated.  Clearly, one could envisage a project where these roles are reversed, where parents’ stories are the object of interest and child protection professionals are the spear carriers.  In such a case, the negotiation of consent would necessarily be inverted.
Discussion
Anticipatory regulatory regimes that transfer models of consent from clinical or biomedical research to ethnography are highly problematic.  Approaches currently adopted in the UK and other developed countries are erecting insuperable barriers to ethnographic work or creating such disincentives that scholars are choosing not to do it.  This presents us with a stark choice – a choice that hinges upon whether or not we believe that ethnography has anything to offer to the creation of a better society, or, at least, to the more efficient, effective, equitable and humane use of resources in the one that we have.   Do we accept the disappearance of ethnographic work or do we revisit the models of regulation that have been imposed on the social sciences?

We happen to believe that ethnography has a vital role in examining the extent to which institutions do what they claim to do, fairly and civilly and with an appropriate mobilisation of resources.  It is the gold standard for the study of processes, a study that is as important for policymakers and practitioners as the study of outcomes Murphy and Dingwall 2003).  If this is accepted, then a regulatory regime that is inimical to such research will replace systematic knowledge with systematic ignorance and undermine the democratic accountability of major institutions operating in or impinging on the public sphere.  Neither seems a particularly ethical consequence of ethical regulation.  In effect, autonomy once again trumps both justice and beneficence as well-intentioned actions bring about negative outcomes. 

There are two further considerations.  The first is a reasonable assessment of the actual risks involved in observational research.  Faced with the need to estimate, in advance, potential harm, researchers and regulators find themselves anticipating hypothetical worst case scenarios with little attention to the empirical evidence of the likelihood of the worst case actually occurring.  In reality the risks to participants of observational research do not begin to approach the risks inherent in most forms of clinical or biomedical experimentation. 

The second is that, if academic researchers are no longer able to conduct observational research, this does not mean that such investigations will not take place.  They will simply be done by our rivals as cultural commentators (Strong 1983), other writers and journalists, working with different kinds of motive and subject to different ethical principles – relatively free of regulatory constraints.  Although journalists can be sued after the event, prior restraint is difficult to achieve.  There are many examples of such investigations – and not only by tabloid journalists.  Serious writers and investigative journalists undertake what amounts to covert research, justified by appeals to the public interest on the one hand and to the freedom of the press on the other (e.g. Ehrenreich 2002; Orwell 2003; Toynbee 2003).  Regulation will not stop observational work, but simply ensure that it is done by people outside its jurisdiction and unconstrained by the standards of scientific rigour expected of academic researchers.  A few academics may use their own life experiences in the form of auto-ethnographic accounts, but these are notoriously unsystematic and unrepresentative, although they may usefully identify potential areas for further work (‘Locus Congressi’ 2006). Policymakers, professionals and citizens will be forced to rely upon less robust findings as a basis for improving the public sphere, since rigorous research will have been forced out by the perverse effects of anticipatory ethical regulation.  

Ethical conduct of ethnographic research ultimately depends upon the personal integrity and ethical education of the researcher.  It is simply not possible to write an unambiguous set of rules for conducting such research or fully to evaluate proposals in an anticipatory process.  During extended fieldwork, unanticipated ethical dilemmas will arise and require immediate resolution.  Increasing bureaucratisation of such research through what Haggerty has called ‘ethics creep’ risks undermining the moral and ethical responsibility of the very researchers it seeks to control.  When ethics becomes institutionalised, rule-following replaces a commitment to working out the ‘right thing to do’ as researchers negotiate the complex moral territory of fieldwork.  The danger is that researchers will come to see satisfying the demands of ethics committees as the be all and end all of ethical practice.  

None of this is to suggest that we can simply ignore ethics or leave it to the consciences of individual researchers.  The good reputation of social scientists is critical to the institutional legitimacy and public standing of our disciplines: unethical behaviour by one member of our community may compromise society’s support for us all.  Given the ever-increasing institutional pressures on individual researchers to increase productivity, the temptations to ride rough-shod over ethical practice are very real.  Some kind of regulation is both inevitable and appropriate.  However, the current system of anticipatory, bureaucratic regulation is not an effective means of ensuring ethical research practice in ethnography. 

It is time to reclaim research ethics from the bureaucrats.  We need to develop and strengthen ‘professional’ models of regulation – albeit in an environment that is, at least temporarily, hostile to professions.  Such models would emphasise education, training and mutual accountability.  They would place more weight on the promotion of sound ethical behaviour than upon pre-empting unacceptable behaviour through anticipatory bureaucracy.  Such professional models might include, for example, a stronger emphasis on ethical discussion in basic research training.  We might consider a system of accrediting or licensing principal investigators and research student supervisors based on the completion of training in ethics and subsequent evidence of continued ethical engagement and awareness.   Accredited individuals could be exempted from external review except in cases where there was significant risk of harm to research participants or a proposed project raised particularly contentious issues.  

There are a number of potential strategies for accomplishing this.  One would place institutional ethics committees at the centre of the accreditation process.  Freed from the excessive workload arising from the current bureaucratic model of prospective consideration of all projects, ethics committees might also find time to monitor research practice in institutions, possibly through a ‘dip-stick’ approach to reviewing projects that are currently underway or recently completed.  They could also consider complaints from those who believe that they have been the butt of unethical research practice.  Ultimately, ethics committees could have the power to suspend the accreditation of investigators and supervisors who are deemed to have engaged in unethical research practices.

However, given their record of bureaucratic excess, it may be better to explore more traditional models that would place accreditation in the hands of the relevant professional communities.  Ferlie and Geraghty (2005) have noted the failure of confrontational regulation to achieve bureaucratic dominance over professionals, resulting as it does in implementation deficits and, often, the delegitimation of the regulators in the face of public trust in the professionals.  Nevertheless, the problem of accountability for expertise remains.  In the light of experience, they argue that traditional forms of peer review and self-regulation may have more to contribute than has been acknowledged in recent years.  What may be required is a process of re-professionalization, where the first tier of regulation influencing skills and values remains under the control of the expert group, even if there is a certain amount of external oversight. 

Journal editors and those examining doctoral theses could also have an enhanced role in promoting sound ethical practice.  As editors ourselves, we are concerned by an increased reliance among referees on authors’ reports that the project has been granted ethical clearance by the relevant ethics committee.  This appears to be at the expense of the referees’ own judgement about the acceptability of the research practices which generated the findings reported.  A similar degrading of the assessment of the ethics underpinning doctoral submissions, by the substitution of ethics committee approval for a professional judgment about the acceptability of the research practice reported in the thesis, can also be observed.  Reasserting the professional responsibilities of reviewers and examiners could be expected to increase the awareness and sensitivity of researchers to ethical dimensions of their practice by highlighting their mutual accountability to their peers.

There is, of course, no reason why any one strategy for regulation should necessarily have a monopoly.  Researchers might choose to seek accreditation through disciplinary associations where these have a strong identity, as in psychology, or to opt for an institutional licence, particularly if they are working in a new or interdisciplinary field.  To some extent, competition between accrediting bodies would serve to keep over-reaching in check, since a licensing regime that was too burdensome would simply lose clients to one taking a more liberal approach.  
Current approaches to the governance of ethnographic research are simply not fit for the purposes for which they are intended.  We have identified a number of characteristics of ethnography that make anticipatory regulation inappropriate.  This is not a problem that can be solved simply by tinkering with the current approach to such research by ethics committees.  It requires a root and branch re-thinking of ethical regulation, and a reassertion of the continuing value of professional self-regulation and mutual accountability.
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^1	  The situation is further complicated by the multiple audiences for such accounts.  Such audiences sometimes include, for example, lawyers who review consent documentation on behalf of universities or publishers to identify any possible grounds for legal action (Adler and Adler, 2002).  As a result, there may be a bias against plain English and in favour of legal dialects, which may be as impenetrable as scientific ones.
^2	  This is a difficulty that has also been reported in relation to biomedical research (Morris and Balmer 2006).
